This paper studies static state estimation in multi-sensor settings, with a caveat that an unknown subset of the sensors are compromised by an adversary, whose measurements can be manipulated arbitrarily. A new performance metric, which quantifies the asymptotic decay rate for the probability of having an estimation error larger than δ, is proposed. We develop an optimal estimator for the new performance metric with a fixed δ, which is the Chebyshev center of a union of ellipsoids. We further provide an estimator that is optimal for every δ, for the special case where the sensors are homogeneous.
In the subsequent sections, we focus on the problem of secure static state estimation with Byzantine sensors. A fusion center aims to estimate a vector state x ∈ R n from measurements collected by m sensors, among which n sensors might be compromised. Without imposing any restrictions on the attacker's capabilities, we assume that the compromised sensors can send arbitrary messages. Static state estimation has a wide range of applications in power system [11] [12] [13] . Secure static state estimation with Byzantine sensors was studied in [14] , [15] as well, which, however, both focused on the one-shot scenario, while in this work the observations are taken sequentially, the possible temporal correlations of which make the analysis more challenging. We should also note that both [14] , [15] used the worst-case estimate error as the performance metric rather than the probabilistic approach in this paper.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1)
We propose a new metric to characterize the performance of an estimator when observation noise is not necessarily bounded and an attacker may be present.
2) We provide an optimal estimator for a given estimation error threshold δ (Theorem 2), which is the Chebyshev center of a union of ellipsoids. We then propose an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal estimator (Algorithm 1 and Theorem 3).
3) When the sensors are homogeneous, we further provide a uniformly optimal estimator, i.e., simultaneously optimal for any error threshold δ (Theorem 4). The estimator is just the "trimmed mean" of the averaged observations.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [16] . The main difference is threefold.
Firstly, new results have been provided in this paper, i.e., numerical implementation of our algorithm (Section III-C) and uniformly optimal estimator design (Section IV). Secondly, in [16] , only proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8 were presented due to page limitation. Lastly, new simulations have been conducted in this paper for better illustration.
Organization: In Section II, we formulate the problem of static state estimation with Byzantine sensors, including the attack model and performance metric. The main results are presented in Section III. We first prove that one may only consider estimators with certain "nice" structures.
Based on this, we then provide an optimal estimator for a given error threshold and propose an efficient and effective algorithm to compute the optimal estimator. Furthermore, a very simple yet uniformly optimal estimator when sensors are homogeneous is provided in Section IV. After
showing numerical examples in Section V, we conclude the paper in Section VI. All proofs are reported in the appendix. March 
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Notations: R (R + ) is the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. N (N + ) is the set of nonnegative (positive) integers. For a vector x ∈ R n , define x 0 as the "zero norm", i.e., the number of nonzero elements of the vector x. For a vector x ∈ R n , the support of x, denoted by supp(x), is the set of indices of nonzero elements:
supp(x) {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : x i = 0}.
Define 1 as the column vector of ones and the size clear from the context if without further notice. Let I n be the identity matrix of size n × n. For a matrix M ∈ R m×n , unless stated otherwise, M i represents the i-th row, and M I the matrix obtained from M after removing all of the rows except those in the index set I. For a set of matrices A ⊆ R m×n , we use A I to denote the set of matrices keeping rows indexed by I, i.e.,
For a set A, define the indicator function as ½ A (x) = 1, if x ∈ A; 0 otherwise. The cardinality of a set A is denoted as |A|. Let M ⊤ denote the transpose of the matrix M . We write M N if M − N is a positive semi-definite matrix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
Consider the problem of estimating the state x ∈ R n using m sensor measurements as depicted in Fig. 1 . Let M {1, . . . , m} be the index set of all the sensors. The measurement equation
where z i (k) ∈ R is the ("true") measurement collected by the sensor i at time k ∈ N + , H i ∈ R 1×n is the output matrix associated with sensor i, w i (k) ∈ R is the observation noise. It is assumed that w i (k) is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and covariance E[(
Furthermore, w i (k) are independent across the sensors and over time, i.e., E[w
1 Actually, the main results in this paper hold for any noise distribution in the exponential family; the details are discussed in
Remark 2
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In the presence of attacks, the measurement received by the fusion center is y i (k), with satisfies the following equation:
where a i (k) ∈ R is the bias injected by the attacker. We assume the attacks are q-sparse:
The fusion center (FC) estimates the underlying state x using sensor measurements that might be manipulated.
Assumption 1 (q-sparse attack). There exists an index set C ⊆ M such that
The sparse attack model, which is conventional in the literature [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , [15] , [17] , says that the set of compromised sensors is somewhat "constant" over time. This is in essence the only restriction we impose on the attacker's capability. The bias a i (k) of a compromised sensor may take any value.
To introduce the knowledge available at the attacker, we need the following definitions. Define the measurement from all sensors at time k to be a column vector:
We further define Y (k) as a matrix of all measurements from time 1 to time k:
The quantities a(k), A(k) are defined in the same manner. At time k, given measurements from all the sensors Y (k), the fusion center generates a state estimatex k . The estimator at time k, denoted by f k , might be random, i.e., given Y (k),x k is random variable governed by certain probability measure on R n determined by f k . Let the overall estimator f (f 1 , f 2 , . . .) be a sequence of estimators from time 1 to ∞. The above assumption is prevailing in the literature as well [8] [9] [10] , [15] , [17] . The parameters H i and W i might be developed by an attacker using the a priori knowledge of sensor models. To obtain the true state, the attacker may deploy its own sensor network. Though it might be difficult in practice to obtain the accurate parameters and true state for an attacker, this assumption is de facto when dealing with potential worst-case attacks. We should note that this assumption is in accordance with the Kerckhoffs's principle [18] , namely the security of a system should not rely on its obscurity.
With Assumptions 1 and 2, the measurements from compromised sensors might take any value and might be correlated across sensors and over time.
We assume that the system designer knows the number q, but does not know the exact set of compromised sensors C. The quantity q might be determined by the a priori knowledge about the quality of each sensor. Alternatively, the quantity q may be viewed as a design parameter, which indicates the resilience level that the designer is willing to pay for.
⊤ be the measurement matrix. We assume that the matrix H is 2q-observable:
Assumption 3. The measurement matrix H is 2q-observable, i.e., for every set I ⊆ M with |I| = m − 2q, the matrix H I is of full column rank.
It has been shown in [6] that 2q-observability of the measurement matrix is a necessary and sufficient condition to recover the exact state under q-sparse attacks when there are no observation noises.
B. Performance Metric
At time k, given the measurements Y (k) C , the bias A(k − 1), the set of compromised sensors C, and true state x, the bias a(k) is generated according to some probability measure on R m . This bias injection mechanism at time k is denoted by g k and the attack strategy by g (g 1 , g 2 , . . .).
Let G be the set of all attack strategies such that the generated bias a(k) satisfies the q-sparse attack model in Assumption 1.
In this paper, we are concerned with the worst-case scenario. Given an estimator f , we define
as the worst-case probability that the distance between the estimate at time k and the true state is larger than a certain value δ ∈ R + considering all possible attack strategies, the set of compromised sensors and the true state. We use the subscript of P f,g,x,C to emphasize that the probability depends on the estimator f , attack strategy g, the true state x, and the set of compromised sensors C.
Ideally, one wants to design an estimator f such that e(f, k, δ) is minimized at any time k for any δ. However, it is quite difficult to analyze e(f, k, δ) when k takes finite values since computing the probability of error usually involves numerical integration. Therefore, we consider an asymptotic estimation performance, i.e., the exponential rate with which the worstcase probability goes to zero:
Obviously, for any δ, the system designer would like to maximize r(f, δ) by choosing a suitable estimator f .
C. Problems of Interest
The following three problems are to be addressed. 2) Optimal estimator. Given δ, what is the optimal estimator that maximizes r(f, δ)?
3) Uniform optimality. Is there estimator that simultaneously maximizes r(f, δ) for all δ > 0?
III. OPTIMAL ESTIMATOR
In this section, the first two problems in Section II-C shall be addressed. We provide an estimator based on Chebyshev centers, prove its optimality, and further present a numerical algorithm to implement it.
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A. Compressed and Deterministic Estimator
A generic estimator f k might randomly generate an estimatex k based on all the information contained in Y (k). In other words, given a different Y (k), the probability measure that governŝ x k might be different. In this subsection, however, we shall show that, without loss of optimality, one may only consider estimators with certain "nice" structure.
Define an operator avg(·) that averages each row of the inputed real-valued matrix, i.e., for
Hence, avg(Y (k)) is a vector in R m and the i-th element is the empirical mean of the observation from time 1 to k available for sensor i.
We use P f (x k |Y (k)) to denote the conditional probability measure of estimatex k given any estimator f ∈ F and the information Y (k).Notice that an estimator f can be completely characterized by the sequence of conditional probability measures from time 1 to ∞: 
Let F (F c , resp.) be the set of all possible (compressed, resp.) estimators. In the following lemma, we show that it suffices to consider an estimator in F c .
Lemma 1.
For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another compressed estimator f ′ ∈ F c such that for all δ > 0, In the following, we refine the set F from another perspective.
Definition 2. An estimator f is said to be deterministic w.r.t Y (k) if for every time k and
Let F d be the set of all estimators that are deterministic w.r.t. Y (k). Then similar to the above lemma we have Lemma 2. For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another deterministic one
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on the above two lemmas, we further refine F .
Definition 3. An estimator f is said to be compressed and deterministic if it is deterministic w.r.t. avg(Y (k)), i.e., there exists a (possibly time-dependent) functionf
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In the following theorem, we show that instead of F , one may only consider the set F cd for our problem.
Theorem 1. For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another compressed and deterministic
Proof. See Appendix C.
B. Optimal Estimator Based on Chebyshev Centers
In this subsection, we propose an optimal compressed and deterministic estimator. To this end, we need the following definitions: The distance of a point x 0 ∈ R n to a bounded and non-empty
Moreover, the set's radius rad(A) ∈ R + and Chebyshev center chv(A) ∈ R n are defined by rad(A) min
chv(A) arg min
Notice that min in (6) and, thus, arg min in (7) are well defined, as shown in Appendix D.
Given y ∈ R m , x ∈ R n , define their inconsistency d x (y) as the optimal value of the following optimization problem:
Further define the set X (y, φ), φ ≥ 0 as the set of x such that the inconsistency with y is upper bounded by φ, i.e.,
Given δ ≥ 0, define X(y, δ) as the biggest X (y, φ) of which the radius is upper bounded by δ:
It is easy to see that X (y, φ) is monotonically increasing w.r.t. φ. As a result, its radius is also increasing. Notice also that given y, the radius rad(X (y, φ)) is upper semi-continuous (see details in Lemma 5 later). Therefore, it might happen that rad(X(y, δ)) < δ for certain δ, while in most cases rad(X(y, δ)) = δ is achieved. Let f * δ be the estimator such that the estimate at time k is the Chebyshev center of X(avg(Y (k)), δ), i.e.,
Intuitively, the estimator f * δ is such that, given observation Y (k) and taken the worst-case attack into account, the "most likely" underlying state x (i.e., of the smaller inconsistency d x (avg(Y (k))) compared to any other state) that lies outside the ball centered at f * δ,k (Y (k)) with radius δ is "least likely" (i.e., of the bigger inconsistency compared to any other estimator).
For y ∈ R m and δ > 0, we define u(y, δ) as the upper bound of the inconsistency between y and the elements in X(y, δ):
With a slight abuse of notation, we define u(δ) as the lower bound of u(y, δ):
We have our first main result about the estimator (11).
Theorem 2. Given any δ > 0, the estimator f * δ in (11) is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the rate (4), i.e., for any estimator f ∈ F ,
Proof. See Appendix E.
C. Numerical Implementation
In this subsection, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute the estimator f * δ proposed above. We shall first propose a method to compute the Chebyshev center and the radius of X (y, φ) for a given φ. This shares a similar spirit with [19] . We then consider how to derive the appropriate φ using a modified bisection method. To proceed, we need the following definition and lemmas.
A variation of d x (y), where the support of a in the definition in (8) is given a priori, is defined as follows:
It is clear that with a fixed set I, d x (y, I) is continuous w.r.t. both x and y. Furthermore,
Lemma 3. When |I| ≥ m − 2q, the restricted inconsistency d x (y, I) can be equivalently written as:
where the "variance"
and the "residue"
with W {I} (different from W I ) being the square matrix obtained from
after removing all of the rows and columns except those in the index set I, and
being the Moore-Penrose inverse.
Proof. See Appendix F.
In the following, we show that computing the Chebyshev center and radius of the set X (y, φ) introduced in (9) can be transferred to a convex optimization problem. Define the following set:
Then one can rewrite X (y, φ) as:
where
In other words, X (y, φ) is a union of ellipsoids.
It is worth pointing out that if res(I) = φ, then X (y, φ, I) degenerates to a single point.
Therefore, to differentiate the ellipsoids and singletons, we define
Lemma 4. Given φ such that I(φ) is not empty. Consider the following semidefinite programming problem:
with * being recovered by symmetry. Then
where c * and ψ * are the optimal solution of the semidefinite programming problem.
It follows from this lemma that, finding the Chebyshev center and radius of the set X (y, φ) is a semidefinite programming problem when y, φ are given. However, we are interested in finding the optimal estimator that maximize the rate r(f, δ), for a given δ. In the following lemma, we
give how rad(X (y, φ)) varies with φ.
Lemma 5. Given any y ∈ R m , the radius rad(X (y, φ)) have the following properties:
2) If rad(X (y, φ)) is discontinuous at a point φ 0 , then there must exist a set I ⊆ M with
Given a predefined approximation bound ε > 0, we compute the corresponding estimatex for an averaged measurement avg(Y (k)) ∈ R m in Algorithm 1. Denoted byf ε the resulting estimator, and byf (y, ε) the output of Algorithm 1 (i.e., the estimatex) when the inputs are y, ε.
Notice that Algorithm 1 is a slight variation of the classic bisection method. The distinguished part lies in (26), which together with Lemma 5 assures that for any y ∈ R m ,
where u(y, δ) is defined in (12) . Therefore, the following theorem readily follows: 
where f * δ is the optimal estimator in (11) Clearly, a smaller ε in Algorithm 1 leads to a better estimator, which, however, requires more iterations to run. and φ be such that rad(X (y, φ)) > δ.
Repeat: 
IV. UNIFORMLY OPTIMAL ESTIMATOR FOR HOMOGENEOUS SENSORS
In this section we provide a simple yet uniformly optimal estimator f such that r(f, δ) is simultaneously maximized for all δ > 0 when the sensors are homogeneous, i.e.,
Notice that when homogeneous sensors are considered, to satisfy the 2q-observable assumption in Assumption 3, the state has to be scalar, i.e., x ∈ R.
To proceed, we first provide an upper bound of the optimal performance proved in Theorem 2, u(δ), for any δ and any system models (instead of only homogeneous sensors).
Lemma 6. The optimal performance u(δ) in (14) is upper bounded:
whereū(δ) = δ 2ū (1) withū (1) being the optimal value of the following optimization problem:
Proof. See Appendix G.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the case where sensors are homogeneous and the system is scalar. Then without loss of generality, we let H i = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We define the estimator f trm be the "trimmed mean", i.e.,
where for any y ∈ R m ,
with y [i] being the i-th smallest element. In other words, trm(y) first discards the largest q and smallest q elements of y, and then averages over the remaining ones. holds for every δ.
Proof. See Appendix H.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Resilience of the Proposed Estimator
In the following, in order to verify the intuitive comments of Remark 3 about the resilience . We let the fourth sensor be attacked, i.e., the first three elements of y are [1; 1; 3] and y 4 = z 4 + a. In particular, we let a vary from 0 to 15. We simulate our estimator f * δ for two different error thresholds δ = 1, 3, and further compare it to the least squares estimator, which computes the estimate as (
we let the performance error tolerance ε = 0.001.
The result is illustrated in Fig. 2 . One sees that when the bias injected a is too large, the estimation error of our algorithm is zero, i.e., the attack effects are eliminated. This is consistent with intuitive comments in Remark 3. Furthermore, when using a smaller δ (i.e., δ = 1 in our example), the estimator tends to discard the injected bias: the zero-error range is a ∈ [3, ∞] for δ = 1, which is contrasted with [8, ∞] for δ = 3. This is because given the same observation y, smaller δ is, smaller φ and, thus, the collection I(φ) are, which means that the "abnormal" data (with large res(I)) will be more likely to be discarded. It is clear that the naive least squares estimator is not resilient to the attack. 
B. Comparison with Other Estimators
In this section, we compare our estimator with the LASSO. In our case, given avg(Y (k)) = y ∈ R m , the LASSO reads
where λ is predefined parameter and the optimal solution x is the estimate. Basically, the smaller λ is, the securer is LASSO. Therefore, in our simulation, we set λ = 10 −3 . Notice that the l 0 and l 1 -based state estimation procedures [6] , [7] works in systems without noises or with (small) bounded measurement noises, while the estimator in [8] (i.e., Algorithm 2 thereof) is undecided for (many) certain observations, that is, it can happen that no subset of sensors are deemed as attack free and, therefore, no output will be generated. We should also note that while [9] proves the resilience of LASSO when each sensor is observable, i.e., H i is scalar in our case, the LASSO under sparse attack is not resilient in general; see [15] . Therefore, we consider scalar state in this simulation and for simplicity, we further assume the sensors are homogeneous.
We assume there are totally m = 5 sensors, of which q = 1 sensor is compromised. We let measurement matrix H = [1; 1; 1; 1; 1] and covariance matrix W = diag (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) . When computing the worst-case probability e(f, k, δ) in (3), we assume that, without loss of generality, the true state is x = 0 and the fifth sensor compromised. We then simulate the error probability for a fixed y 5 with y = avg(Y (k)) being the averaged measurement, the maximum of which is then regarded as the worst-case probability e(f, k, δ). From Fig. 3 , one sees that for either δ = 1 or δ = 1.5, the performances of f trm and f * δ are quite close, which is consistent with the uniform optimality of f trm stated in Theorem 4. One should also note that both f trm and f * δ outperform the LASSO. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provided a different perspective on secure static state estimation with
Byzantine sensors by introducing a new probabilistic performance metric, i.e., the decaying rate of the worst-case probability that the estimation error is larger than some value δ rather than the worst-case error or estimation error covariance in the existing literature. This new metric does not necessarily require bounded noise. With this metric, we gave an optimal estimator for any given error threshold δ, which is the Chebyshev center of a certain set, and proposed an efficient algorithm to compute it. A significant byproduct is that if distribution of the observation noise is in the exponential family, the sufficient statistic remains the same whether or not the attacker is present. When the sensors are homogeneous, we further derived a simple yet uniformly optimal estimator, which, to be specific, is the trimmed mean of the averaged observations and simultaneously optimal for every δ. The proof is of constructive nature and mainly stems from the fact that avg(Z(k)) is a sufficient statistic of Z(k), where Z(k) is the "true" measurement matrix when there are no attacks and is defined in the same manner with Y (k).
In the following, for simplicity of presentation, we do not distinguish the probability density function (pdf) for a continuous random variable and probability mass function (pmf) for a discrete one. Therefore, in some cases the summation is actually needed though we use integration universally.
For any f ∈ F , we let f ′ satisfy (31) and (32). For any y ∈ R m , Borel set A ⊆ R n , and time
where dP(Z(k) = Y | avg(Z(k)) = y) is the derivative of the conditional probability measure
Notice that the conditional probability measure
is a sufficient statistic of the "true" measurements Z(k) for the underlying state x, i.e., for any state x,
Notice that RHS of (31) can be interpreted as "taking expectation" of the conditional probability measure P f (x k |Y (k)) given that avg(Y (k)) = y and that Y (k) shares the same distribution with Z(k).
Furthermore, let f ′ be in F c , i.e.,
for any Borel set A ⊆ R n whenever avg(Y (k)) = avg(Y ′ (k)).
Let B δ (x) denote the closed ball centered at x ∈ R n with radius δ > 0:
Regarding with f and f ′ , in the remainder of this proof we devote ourselves to showing that the following inequality holds for any state x, set C, δ > 0 and time k:
from which Lemma 1 follows straightforwardly.
We first identify the most harmful attack strategy for a generic f . Given state x, set C, δ > 0, time k, and estimator f , consider the following optimization problem:
Denote its optimal solution (i.e., the "manipulated matrix") as mm(f, x, C, δ, k). Then one may verify that changing the measurements of the compromised sensors available at time k, Y (k) C , to mm(f, x, C, δ, k) would maximize the error 2 probability under estimator f . The optimal value of the optimization problem (35) is just the worst-case error probability sup g∈G P f,g,x,C (x k ∈ B δ (x)).
We then identify the most harmful attack strategy for the compressed estimator f ′ . Given state
x, set C, δ > 0, time k, and estimator f ′ , consider the following optimization problem:
Denote its optimal solution (i.e., the "manipulated vector") as mv(f ′ , x, C, δ, k). One may verify that changing the measurements of the compromised sensors available at time k such that avg(Z(k)) C = mv(f ′ , x, C, δ, k) would maximize the error probability under estimator f ′ . The optimal value of the optimization problem (36) is just the worst-case error probability
For the sake of better presentation, in the remainder of this proof, for any matrix M , we rewrite M M\C as M [1] and M C as M [2] . We also omit the time index k of Z(k) and Y (k).
The set B δ (x) is denoted by B. Notice that the "true" measurements Z are independent across sensors given the underlying state x. Therefore, we can rewrite (31) as follows:
Then one obtains that
where the second equality follows from the law of total probability, and the inequality holds because P(Z [2] | avg(Z [2] ) = y [2] ) is a probability measure for any y [2] , i.e., for any y [2] . The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A. Preliminaries
In the following lemma, we bound the area where a random variable has a high probability showing up.
Given any random variable y ∈ R n , we shall say that a point x is δ-typical, if
where B δ (x) is the closed ball defined in (33). In other words, y has a high probability lying in the δ-neighborhood of x.
Let T δ (y) denote the set of all δ-typical point x w.r.t. a random variable y, i.e.,
We have the following lemma to show that T δ (y) lies in a ball with radius δ:
Lemma 7. For any random variable y ∈ R n , there exists x * ∈ R n such that
To proceed, we need the following lemma:
. . , A n be n random events with the same underlying probability space, then it holds that
Proof of Lemma 8.
where A c is the complement of set A. The proof is thus complete.
Proof of Lemma 7.
In the following argument, the dimension n is fixed. If A is empty, then
If A only contains j ≤ (n + 1) elements, say, x 1 , . . . , x j . Then Lemma 8 together with (37) yields that
. If A contains j > (n + 1) elements (j might be infinite). Then again by Lemma 8, one obtains that for any n + 1 elements, say, x 1 , . . . , x n+1 , there holds
is compact and convex for any x, then Helly's theorem [20] means that
The proof is thus complete.
Definition 5.
Any point x * ∈ R n is said to be a δ-center of a random variable y ∈ R n if it is such that (39) holds.
The following is readily from Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. If x * ∈ R n is a δ-center of a random variable y ∈ R n , then for any x ∈ R n :
B. Main Body
Consider any estimator f ∈ F , we construct a deterministic one f ′ ∈ F d : for any time k and
, the existence of which is guaranteed by Lemma 7.
Hence, for any attack strategy g, true state x, set of compromised sensors C, and time k, we have
where the inequality follows from Lemma 9. Then it is clear that
Recall that e(f, k, δ) is the worst-case probability defined in (3). Then it follows that for any
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider a compressed but possibly random estimator f ∈ F c , we construct a deterministic one f ′ ∈ F cd satisfying:
• for any time k and observations
The existence of f ′ is guaranteed by Lemma 7 and the fact that random variables
Then as in Appendix B, one obtains r(f, δ) ≤ r(f ′ , δ), which, together with Lemma 1, concludes the proof.
APPENDIX D WELL-DEFINEDNESS OF (6)
Since A is bounded, there must exist a ball covering it, i.e., A ⊆ B γ (x ′ 0 ) holds for some x ′ 0 ∈ R n , γ > 0. Then one concludes that
and, therefore,
where the minimum is achieved in the second equality due to the fact that the function dist(·, A)
is continuous for a fixed set A and B 2γ (x ′ 0 ) is compact. As a result, there exists an x 0 to achieve the infimum on the LHS. The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first provide prove that r(f, δ) is upper-bounded by u(δ) for any f ∈ F in Lemma 11.
We then show that r(f * δ , δ) = u(δ) in Lemma 12. Before proceeding, we need the following supporting definitions and lemmas. Helly's theorem [20] implies that
A. Supporting Definition and Lemmas
Hence, for any x 0 ∈ ∩ x∈A B γ (x), A ⊆ B γ (x 0 ). Therefore rad(A) ≤ γ, which contradicts the condition rad(A) > γ.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the sequence of functions (f 1 (avg(Y(1))), f 2 (avg(Y(2))), . . .)
from time 1 to ∞ to denote a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ F cd .
Definition 6. Given a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ F cd , x ∈ R n , δ > 0, and time k, let Y(f, x, δ, k) be the set of averaged measurements avg(Y(k)) such that the estimatê
B. Upper Bound
Lemma 11. For any estimator f ∈ F , there holds
Proof. We show that r(f, δ) < u(δ) + ǫ for any ǫ > 0 and f ∈ F .
Given ǫ > 0, from the definition of u(δ), one obtains that there must exist y * ∈ R m and a set A ⊆ R n such that:
2) rad(A) > δ.
Then Lemma 10 yields that there exists A 0 ⊆ A such that rad(A 0 ) > δ and |A 0 | ≤ n + 1. Let a * (y, x) be the optimal solution to the optimization problem in (8) given y ∈ R m and x ∈ R n .
Since d x (y, I) in (15) is continuous w.r.t. y and |A 0 | ≤ n + 1, then one obtains that there exists
for every x ∈ A 0 and every y ∈ B β (y * ).
By Theorem 1, one suffices to consider a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ F cd . Furthermore, since rad(A 0 ) > δ, one concludes that for every time k and f ∈ F cd , there holds
Let L n (·) denote the Lebesgue measure on R n . Because of countable additivity of Lebesgue measure [21] , one obtains that there must exist a point x * ∈ A 0 such that
For the sake of simplicity, let B(
Then it is clear that e(f, k, δ)
where B(o, k) with o ∈ R q is the projected set of B(x * , k):
Further let B(k) be a set that satisfies:
and for any υ > 0, there exists o ∈ R q such that
Roughly speaking, B(k) can be viewed as the supremum set. Then one obtains that
In the following, we focus on characterizing the term in (49). Let p x * (·) : R m−q → R + be the probability density of avg(Z(k)) M\I * conditioned on the underlying state x * , i.e.,
the square matrix obtained from W after removing all of the rows and columns except those in the index set M \ I * , and N (µ, Σ, x) the probability density function of a Guassian random variable with mean µ and variance Σ taking value at x. Then one obtains that
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Furthermore, γ can be determined by m, n, q, and β, which is, in particular, irrelevant to time k. Let Z(x * , k) ⊆ B β (y * ) M\I * be the preimage of (p,p) under the function p x * (·), where p min z∈B β (y * ) M\I * p x * (z) is the minimum value 3 andp is such that
Notice thatp exists since L m−q ({z : p x * (z) = p}) = 0 for any p. Then one obtains that
Notice that the preimage of an open set under a continuous function is also open, Z(x * , k) is thus open. Furthermore, since both γ and B β (y * ) are independent of time k, Z(x * , k) will be an nonempty set whatever k is. Therefore, the following holds:
where first inequality is due to the Cramér's Theorem [22] 
C. Achievability
About the estimator f * δ defined in (11), we have the following lemma:
Proof. Under f * δ , it holds that for any time k, underlying state x and the index set I:
and the inequality is due to the fact that for any Since the above argument holds for any x and I, one concludes that r(f * δ , δ) ≥ u(δ). Furthermore, r(f * δ , δ) is upper bounded by u(δ) due to Lemma 11, the proof is thus complete. Notice that H I H + I is an orthogonal projector, one then obtains (16) . Furthermore, by Assumption 3, H I is of full column rank for any I with |I| ≥ m − 2q, the pseudo-inverse is thus given in (19) . The proof is thus complete. holds, where φ → φ + 0 means that |φ−φ 0 | → 0 and φ−φ 0 > 0. Notice also that rad(X (y, φ)) = 0 for all φ ≤ res [1] . Therefore, one can conclude Lemma 5.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Let x * , s * be the optimal solution to the optimization problem (27). Further let x ∈ R n be any vector and I 0 , I 1 the two index sets such that I 0 ∪ I 1 = supp(s * ), |I 0 | ≤ q, and |I 1 | ≤ q. We then construct the following three quantities x 0 , x 1 ∈ R n and y * ∈ R m : Then one verifies that
Therefore, x 0 , x 1 ∈ X (y * ,ū(δ)). Combining (54), one then obtains that rad(X (y * ,ū(δ))) ≥ δ.
Notice that the optimal valueū(δ) is continuous and strictly increasing. Combing (56), one concludes that for any ǫ > 0, there exists y ∈ R m such that rad(X (y,ū(δ) + ǫ)) > δ.
Therefore, from the definition of u(δ), one obtains that u(δ) ≤ū(δ) for any δ. The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX H PROOF OF THEOREM 4
It suffices to prove that for every y ∈ R m , d x (y) ≥ū(|x − trm(y)|)
holds for every x ∈ R, where recall thatū(δ) is the upper bound in Lemma 6.
Since the sensors are homogeneous, then without loss of generality, we let W i = W/2 for Therefore, (57) holds and the proof is complete.
